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COMMENTARY

A Landmark Global Treaty at
Montreal*
On September 16, 1987, at the conclusion of a conference held in
Montreal, representatives of 24 nations from every continent signed a
treaty to limit production and consumption of several chemicals that are
believed to cause virtually irreversible damage to the fragile stratospheric
ozone layer. Among the signatories were nearly all of the world's major
producers and consumer countries. In addition, other nations among the
nearly 50 in attendance indicated that they would probably join in the
coming months.
The accord provides for a near-term freeze, followed by scheduled
reductions, in use of several chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) and bromine (halon)
compounds. Depletion of the ozone layer caused by these synthetic chemicals would result in increased ultraviolet radiation reaching the earth's
surface, with potentially significant adverse implications for human, animal, and plant life. In addition, CFCs have the qualities of a "greenhouse
gas," thus contributing to the global warming trend and the resulting
dangers for agriculture and rising sea levels. Against these risks were
weighed the costs of replacing chemicals useful in refrigeration, air conditioning, plastics, insulation, aerosol sprays, fire fighting, and computers.
Several features of the Montreal treaty, and the process by which it
was achieved, mark it as a historic accomplishment with important lessons
for future international environmental cooperation. First, it was unprecedented for the global community to impose controls on an important
industrial sector before actual damages to human health and ecology were
registered. This was not a response to an environmental disaster, such as
Chernobyl or the Rhine River spill. Rather, it was a conscious preventative
action, on a global scale, which involved several years of collaborative
scientific research and analysis, and arduous intergovernmental negotiations to reconcile numerous diverse and conflicting interests.
Second, the treaty could never have been accomplished without close
cooperation between government policymakers and the international scientific community, working at the frontiers of modern science. Only
relatively recent-and still evolving-advances in computer modeling of
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NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

atmospheric chemistry and satellite measurement of ozone and trace gases
could enable governments to undertake costly controls in advance of
actual recorded damages. (It is worth noting that the widely publicized
"hole" in the ozone layer over the South Pole was not factored into the
negotiations because of the lack of evidence that this phenomenon could
occur outside of the unique Antarctic climate.)
Third, in the face of remaining uncertainty concerning the extent both
of future ozone depletion and of potential deleterious effects, the parties
undertook a unique process of risk assessment. Government officials,
scientists, and representatives of industry and environmental groups met
as individuals in a series of informal workshops, without predetermined
national positions. To a degree that surprised even many participants, this
innovative process was able to achieve a cooperative spirit and a degree
of consensus even before the actual negotiations began. The treaty negotiations themselves covered only four formal sessions in the 10-month
period from December 1986 to September 1987. Considering the complexity of the issues involved-political, environmental, economic, scientific, technological, trade, geographical-this was an impressive
achievement.
Fourth, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) played a
critical role in this process. This small UN agency, with an annual budget
of less than $40 million, sponsored the workshops and negotiations and
provided an objective international forum without the extraneous political
debate that has so often marred the work of other UN bodies. The political
sensitivity and diplomatic skills of UNEP's executive director Mostafa
Tolba, himself a scientist, were indispensable during the often hard negotiations. UNEP was the very model of how a UN agency should function.
Fifth, the leadership role of the United States, which had as early as
1978 undertaken major controls on CFCs, and which is the center for
scientific research on this subject, was a major factor. Especially during
the period from fall 1986 through spring 1987, a series of diplomatic
initiatives, bilateral scientific and policy missions, and use of international
media all served to reach foreign policymakers and publics-which in
some countries were initially hostile or indifferent-with the rationale for
the U.S. position. The treaty as eventually signed was, in fact, based on
the structure and concept initially advanced by the United States late in
1986.
The U.S. private sector and Congress made important contributions to
the process. U.S. environmental groups helped inform foreign public
opinion of the dangers of ozone layer depletion, while American industry
was far ahead of European and Japanese producers in acknowledging its
responsibility and supporting further controls on both CFCs and halons.
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And the U.S. Congress, through hearings, resolutions, and proposed
legislation, served notice to the rest of the world that, if an acceptable
international accord were not attained, it was prepared to legislate unilaterally, with trade restrictions against countries not accepting their share
of this global responsibility.
While the Montreal treaty is not perfect and will require further technical and legal clarification, it does represent a prudent international
insurance policy in response to a very complex set of issues and uncertainties. An important innovation is the firm schedule for reductions in
consumption and production of the controlled chemicals, which provides
clear market incentives to industry to develop new technologies and substitute products. (In this connection, The Conservation Foundation, together with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Environment
Canada, co-sponsored a conference and trade fair in January 1988 on
substitutes and alternatives to CFCs and halons.) Another significant element of the treaty is that it is crafted as a dynamic instrument, which
can be adapted to changing conditions, such as implications of the still
emerging scientific evidence on the Antarctic ozone "hole." In sum, in
undertaking collaborative preventative action to protect future generations
from potential dangers, the nations represented at Montreal charted new
paths in environmental cooperation and established both a precedent and
a standard by which future international negotiations will be measured.
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